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Abstract 
    We attempt to identify in this paper the role of trading noise as a transactions 
cost to market participant in the sense of Stoll (2000), especially in the presence of 
trading concentration. Applying the measures of Hu (2006) and Kang and Yeo (2008), 
we analyze the noise proportion in intraday stock returns and its interaction with 
investor herding and search cost. Although this noise is high on individual orders and 
low on institutional orders, its behavior at market open is entirely different from the 
rest of the day. Noises for small cap stocks, unlike volatilities, are lower than those for 
large cap stocks. We also found that noise relates positively to trading volume, but 
inversely to holdings and turnover ratio of institutional investors. Responses from 
institutional and individuals are quite the opposite. The noise proportion generated by 
individual order rises with institutional turnover and search cost encountered, while 
that of institutional order behaves just oppositely. At market open, behaviors of noise 
from institutional and individual orders just switch mutually, and then switch back 
afterwards. Also, noise from high-cap stocks is actually more responsive than that 
from low-cap ones across investors. So trading noise is a specific transactions cost, 
prominent to only certain investors, at certain time and for certain stocks in the market, 
rather than a general market friction as argued in Stoll (2000). This transactions cost 
is inversely related to search costs encountered in trading, which depends on investor, 
trading hour of day and market capitalization of stocks. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Trading in markets involves general transaction costs applicable to the entire market as well as 
specific costs only born by certain investors. The former acts as a friction in trading, which could be 
noises as argued in Stoll (2000) or herding out of information cascades (see Nofsinger and Sias 
(1999), Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) and Avery and Zemsky 
(1999, AZ), among others). The latter could take the form of either information asymmetry (as 
discussed in Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), Admati 
(1991), Easley and O’Hara (1992) and Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1997)) or search cost as 
modeled in Vayanos and Wang (2007, VW). This study addresses the role of trading noise as a 
transactions cost to market participant, especially in the presence of trading concentration. 
Specifically, we attempt to verify if trading noise really qualifies to be a general transactions cost, or 
a market friction, in an intraday framework. 
It has been well document in Amihud and Mendelson (1987), Stoll and Whaley (1990), and 
Stoll (2000) that stock return volatility is the highest right after market opens. Stoll (2000) 
suggested that the high volatility is caused by friction, a general transaction cost for everyone in the 
market. Alternatively, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992, LSV), Choe, Kho and Stulz, (1998),  
Wermers (1999) as well as Bowe and Domuta (1998) stressed that volatility is closely related to 
information-induced herding. However, VW and Lin, Tsai and Sun (2010) argue that price 
variations from trading concentration should be considered as a specific, rather than general, 
transaction cost. Based on that notion, an investor can optimize by allocating trades over when 
transaction cost specific to the investor is the most favorable. Hu (2006) applied a return 
decomposition mechanism to conclude that specific transaction cost causes the market to be volatile 
at open since frictional noises are the smallest during the day. We adopt this concept but attempt to 
identify its driving factor, as how Lin, et al. (2009) analyses factors behind trading concentration. 
 We found that noise component of return volatility is stronger when trading is more 
concentrated, suggesting a different perspective from Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) and Hu (2006). 
Although the time needed to fill an order, or the inverse of the number of orders matched with a 
certain time window, produces less noise, it is quite the contrary at market open. Moreover, we 
argue noise is influenced more by trading concentration, at open, when search cost prevails in 
market transaction, than at close. We also found that limit order book dispersion, which measures how 
tightly the orders are placed to each other or how closely they are to the midquote, affect trading noise.  
But the pattern for foreign institutional is just the opposite to that for individual investors. Response of 
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noise to order dispersion, or search cost, differs by market capitalizations as well as by trading hours. 
 We consider trading activity more in an dynamic sense by measuring order intensity not by 
quantity, but by it sequences based on Patterson and Sharma (2006, PS). It captures intraday order 
flows better than the popular LSV method, one more suitable for longer time frame. In the context 
of investor herding, we adopted a cost-based framework of trading concentration to see how return 
volatility decomposition should be evaluated. The dynamic trading intensity helps us capturing how 
‘friction’ really arise from trades. As search cost goes up, so does noise. However, search generates 
less noise at market open than at market close. Therefore, noise is lower when specific search cost 
prevails, and noise gets higher when general friction rises. 
Although noise proportion of stock returns is high on individual orders and low on institutional 
orders, its behavior at market open is entirely different from the rest of the day. Noises for small cap 
stocks, unlike volatilities, are lower than those for large cap stocks. We also found that noise relates 
positively to trading volume, but inversely to holdings and turnover ratio of institutional investors. 
Nnot only falls when herding is the most significant, but also inversely related to search cost 
proxies. Over an intraday session, although noise increases over time, it is influenced less and less 
by investor herding. Moreover, trading noise is also found to be sensitive to only certain investors in 
the market when they trade heavily. Only investors with lower search cost drives up market noise in 
heavy trading. Trading noise maybe just a specific transaction cost, as information cost, prominent 
to only certain investors in the market. If trading noise is not compatible with general market 
phenomena, then it may not be a general transaction cost as argued in Stoll (2000). Trading noise 
could well be just another kind of specific cost, rather than a market friction. 
Our study helps identifying for various types of investors a more cost-efficient time to trade. 
Both individual and foreign institutional investors (FII’s), although facing higher search cost, bear 
relatively much lower general transaction cost caused by noise, especially at market open, when 
there is significantly intensive trading. But foreign institutional benefit more from trading at market 
close than at market open when trading do not concentrate. The results of this study contribute 
highly to the understanding of search cost and its influence on noise. A brief literature review and 
discussion is given in Section II. Data and empirical results are laid out in Section III. Conclusion is 
given in Section IV. 
 
II. Noise and Trading 
 
Trading noise has long been considered a crucial factor to asset returns. When market trading 
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is heavily concentrated, noise plays a more important role. Literatures have modeled noise as 
investor irrationality or information barrier, among others. Although the direct effect of noise 
trading to a securities market seems to be reducing informational efficiency, standard models 
feature strong countervailing effects. Greater noise trading induces rational agents to trade more 
aggressively on their existing information and provides them with incentives to acquire better 
information. As a result, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Kyle (1985), argued that noise trading 
does not reduce informational efficiency. Furthermore, Kyle (1985) suggested that noise trading 
improves informational efficiency. 
However, competing models contend that rational agents do not fully offset noise traders’ 
demands because of various limits to arbitrage. De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) 
indicated rational arbitrageurs sometimes reinforce demand shocks from noise traders because they 
anticipate mispricing will worsen in the short-run. Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) classified 
herding behavior into rational and irrational ones. Rational herding takes place when investors make 
the same response to a piece of information or when they exhibit similar preference for a stock, 
while irrational herding occurs as investors ignore their own information but imitate or follow 
others’ trades.  
Many have studied situations of trading against one's own private information (e.g., Jarrow 
(1992), Allen and Gale (1992), Allen and Gorton (1992), Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2004a)) in the 
analysis of market manipulation, where the informed may trade in a wrong direction to increase 
noise in trading volume. They tend to adopt models other than Kyle (1985). There are several 
studies modeling trading manipulation with variations of Kyle (1985), such as Chakraborty and 
Yilmaz (2004) and Huddart, Hughes, and Levine (2001). Herding behavior is also considered a 
challenge to the efficient market paradigm. At a group level it is considered irrational as it leads to 
mispricing, but it can be rational at an individual level. Literatures argue that the herding arises 
from the interaction among agents as they copy each other’s decisions. The models of BHW and 
Bannerjee (1992) considered that individuals make their decisions sequentially at a time, taking into 
account the decisions of the individuals preceding them. The model proposed by Cont and 
Bouchaud (2000) considered, instead of a sequential decision process, a random communication 
structure. Random interactions between agents lead to a heterogeneous market structure. AZ argues 
that information cascades will be short-lived and fragile as one contrarian trade from the herd can 
quickly stop an information cascade. 
Noise and Information 
Following the definition of Hu (2006), we make the following decomposition of the log price 
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of a given stock, 
ttt nmP += , 0][ =+ jtt nE , and 0][ =+ jttt nnE as j→∞ (1) 
where tm  is considered as the permanent component of the stock price and follows a random walk 
process,  
ttt umm += −1 , 0][1 =− tt uE , 22 ][ utuE σ= , and 0][ =−ittnuE , i=1,2,… (2) 
Where tu  is a white noise and is orthogonal to 1−tm . The other component of tP , tn , is a 
temporary noise which disappears over time. After simple algebra, we would obtain 
tjttt nPPE =− + ][ as j→∞ (3) 
The volatility of stock return )( 1−− tt PPVar  can be decomposed into )( tuVar , )( 1−− tt nnVar  and 
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will be used as a relative measure of noise within stock return volatility subsequently. When noise 
ratio of the entire market is computed, transactions price is used. But the midpoint of buy and sell 
order price is used in place of market price when noise ratio of a certain type of investor is to be 
computed. 
 Table I reports noise proportion and return volatility computed according to the definition 
above, by market capitalization and intraday interval. Volatilities and noise proportions of small-cap 
stocks exhibit in general a U-shaped pattern across a trading day, but noise for large-cap stocks tend 
to go up from open to close. Although this noise is high on individual orders and low on 
institutional orders, its behavior at market open is entirely different from the rest of the day. Noises 
for small cap stocks, unlike volatilities, are lower than those for large cap stocks. We also found that 
noise relates positively to trading volume, but inversely to holdings and turnover ratio of 
institutional investors. 
We found that noise proportion of stock returns not only falls when herding is the most 
significant, but also inversely related to search cost proxies. Over an intraday session, although 
noise increases over time, it is influenced less and less by investor herding. Moreover, trading noise 
is also found to be sensitive to only certain investors in the market when they trade heavily. Only 
investors with lower search cost drives up market noise in heavy trading. Trading noise maybe just 
a specific transaction cost, as information cost, prominent to only certain investors in the market. If 
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trading noise is not compatible with general market phenomena, then it may not be a general 
transaction cost as argued in Stoll (2000). Trading noise could well be just another kind of specific 
cost, rather than a market friction. 
 
A measure of herding 
 We consider trading activity more in an dynamic sense by measuring order intensity not by 
quantity, but by it sequences based on Patterson and Sharma (2006, PS). It captures intraday order 
flows better than the popular LSV method, one more suitable for longer time frame. In the context 
of investor herding, we adopted a cost-based framework of trading concentration to see how return 
volatility decomposition should be evaluated. The dynamic trading intensity helps us capturing how 
‘friction’ really arise from trades. As search cost goes up, so does noise. However, search generates 
less noise at market open than at market close. Therefore, noise is lower when specific search cost 
prevails, and noise gets higher when general friction rises. 
To gauge the extent of trading concentration, we have adopted a dynamic measure specifically 
for a high frequency trading environment. Most of the studies carried out to test for herding in 
capital markets have proved inconclusive. The common LSV measure computes the proportion of 
market participants buying or selling within a given period and hence cannot capture dynamic order 
flows. Its inference relies on conventional t-test, making it subject to distributional imperfections 
especially with high frequency data. As a result, various measures have been proposed lately to 
overcome its limitations. Radalj and McAleer (1993) noted that the main reason for the lack of 
empirical evidence of herding may lie in the choice of data frequency, in the sense that too 
infrequent data sampling would lead to intra-interval herding being missed (at monthly, weekly, 
daily or even intra-daily intervals). For the purposes of our investigation we used the PS measure, 
which we consider the most suitable, since it overcomes this problem of intraday data. Constructed 
from intraday data, it has a major advantage of not assuming herding to vary with extreme market 
conditions, and considering the market as a whole rather than a just the institutional investors.  
PS statistic measures herding intensity in terms of the number of runs. The bootstrapped 
runs test of PS uses run numbers of buy and sells orders3. As our data set contains identification of 
buy or sell orders, we would not need Lee and Ready (1991) and Finucane (2002) to determine 
directions of investors’ trading directions. If traders engage in systematic herding, the statistic 
should take significantly negative values, since the actual number of runs will be lower than 
                                                 
3
 The formula of runs is according to Mood (1940), but with non-trading adjustments. 
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expected. 
2,1
)1()21(),,( 　　　 =
−−+
= i
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pnpr
tjix iii   (4) 
Where ir  is the actual number of type i runs (up runs, down runs or zero runs), n is the total number of 
trades executed on asset j on day t, ½ is a discontinuity adjustment parameter and ip  is the 
probability of finding a type of run i. Under asymptotic conditions, the statistic ),,( tjix  has a 
normal distribution with zero mean and variance 
222 )1(3)1(),,( iiii pppptji −−−=σ   (5) 
So the herding intensity statistic is expressed as 
),,(
),,(),,(
2 tji
tjix
tjiH
σ
=   (6) 
which has an asymptotic distribution of N(0,1). Mood (1940) requires state variables to be 
independent and i.i.d. as well as continuously distributed. As realized transaction price of stock is 
discrete, ),,( tjiH  would have a non-normal distribution and critical values for testing the 
existence of herding would have to be constructed through bootstrapping the sample. 
The distribution of significant herding percentages, not reported here, suggest that intraday 
trading concentration is heavier in the opening interval. Table II gives the sizes of buy and sell 
orders, in lots of one thousand shares, for all days where herding is significant at 1%. The average 
order size at market close is much larger than in other periods. The ratios of average buy orders to 
average sell orders, for days when herding is significant at 1%, is slightly higher than for the entire 
period. Among investor types, buy-sell ratios are greater than 1 for all institutionals during days of 
herding, and the ratios for FII’s and Proprietary Dealers are higher than their counterpart in all 
periods. Looking further into the opening intervals, we find that overall buy-sell ratios during 
significant herding days are actually lower than the entire period. But for the closing interval, not 
only the ratios are generally higher than those in the opening interval, but those in significant 
herding days are also higher than in the entire period. This pattern coincides with intraday trading 
noise as both rise from open to close. If we look at stocks in the top and bottom return deciles, the 
buy-sell ratios are, as expected, higher in the top return decile. In the bottom return decile, buy-sell 
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ratios are in general lower than 1. Buy-sell ratios in the closing intervals are uniformly higher, 
around 20%, than in the opening intervals. Even for the bottom return decile, there appears to be a 
stronger, about 24% in magnitude, buying force near market close than right after market open. 
A model of trading concentration 
 VW proposed a model with two assets traded in two markets respectively. Measures of buyers 
and sellers of asset i are denoted by ibµ  and isµ  respectively. For the buyers, there is a possibility 
of either enjoying the full value of the dividend flow or switching to a lower level with a Poisson 
rate of κ. Because buyers differ in their switching rates κ, they have different reservation values in 
the bargaining game. Investors are heterogeneous in their horizons, which are inversely related to 
the switching rates κ. More trading could be generated by shorter horizons as it reduces search 
times and trading costs. Switching rates could correspond to buyers’ characteristics, such as long 
horizon is more relevant to insurance companies, while shorter ones belong to hedge funds. A 
clientele equilibrium where market 1 is the one with the most sellers has the following properties: 
(a) More buyers and sellers in market 1: )(1 κµb  > )(2 κµb  and )(1 κµs  > )(2 κµs   
(b) Higher buyer-seller ratio in market 1: )(/)( 11 κµκµ sb  > )(/)( 22 κµκµ sb  
(c) Higher prices in market 1: )(1 κp  > )(2 κp  for all κ. 
Market 1 has not only more sellers than market 2, but also more buyers, and a higher buyer-seller 
ratio4. Moreover, the price that any given buyer expects to pay is higher in market 1. Since there are 
more sellers in market 1, buyers’ search times are shorter. Therefore, holding all else constant, 
buyers prefer entering into market 1. To restore equilibrium, prices in market 1 must be higher than 
in market 2. This is accomplished by higher buying pressure in market 1, i.e., higher buyer-seller 
ratio. In the resulting equilibrium, there is a clientele effect. Investors with high switching rates, 
who have a stronger preference for short search times, prefer market 1 despite the higher prices. On 
the other hand, low-switching-rate investors, who are more patient, value more the lower prices in 
market 2. The clientele effect is, in turn, what accounts for the larger measure of sellers in market 1 
since the high-switching-rate buyers turn faster into sellers. So in essence, cost characteristics of 
investors determine concentration of trading and prices, rather than information about the assets. 
Individual investors trading for own accounts with unleveraged funds are supposed to have 
                                                 
4
 Summary statistics from our data do indicated that average total buy orders, sell orders and their ratios of a stock in a 
given day are 498, 487 and 1.1035 respectively for days when herding measures are not significant. For days with 
significant herding measures, however, the corresponding figures are 3,281, and 1.4420 respectively. 
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lower switching rates and prefer market 2 in the model above. However, when market moves fast, 
lack of knowledge could elevate their switching rates so they turn to trade in market 1 instead. 
Naturally, there should be more herding from the individual and FII’s, according to prediction (a) 
and (b), especially at market open and close. If the ratio of number of buyer to that of seller 
contributes more to the buildup of trading noise, we would conclude that search cost, or the specific 
transaction cost, prevails in that occasion, and vice versa. In a quote-driven market setup, difference 
of composite buy and sell order price would be a good proxy for short term search cost too. 
Similarly, the time needed to fill a buy or sell order in a given period measures the cost of searching 
as well. 
A measure of order dispersion 
Limit order book dispersion can describe the tightness of the book by examining how far apart 
from each other (or from the midquote) the limit orders are placed in the book. It captures the execution 
price innovation expected by the limit order trader when he sacrifices demand of immediacy and instead 
provides liquidity to the market. Foucault, Kadam, and Kandel (2005) and Wei (2005) suggest that the 
limit order book dispersion is linked with the patience of limit order traders and the pick-off risk they 
face. We adopt the following measure by modifying the dispersion measure of Kang and Yeo (2008).  
The dispersion measure of stock i in a given day is defined as  
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 (7) 
where bjDst is the price interval between the jth best buy order price and its next better order price, 
and similarly sjDst  is that for the sell order price. The buy and sell price intervals, up to the fifth best 
limit orders are weighted by bjw  and 
s
jw , the size of the corresponding buy or sell limit orders. For the 
whole market, transaction prices are used to compute the first price interval, while for each type of 
investors, average of buy and sell order price at each priority level is used instead. This dispersion 
measure is designed to show how clustered or dispersed the limit orders are in the book. It measures 
how tightly the orders are placed to each other or how closely they are to the midquote. The higher the 
dispersion is, the less tight the book is, and the lower amount of liquidity the limit order book provides. 
It is a well known fact in Taiwan that, due to funding liquidity, individual investors tend to hold 
and trade stocks with lower prices, while institutional investors concentrate more on high price stocks. 
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Therefore, bjDst
 
and sjDst
 
in (7) are computed using the raw price distance divided by tick size of 
the stock, so that only the relative price distance is used, allowing iDsp  to be comparable across stocks 
and various types of investors. 
 
III. Data and empirical results 
This study employs intra-day order book data from the Taiwan Stock Exchange starting from 
March 1st, 2005 to December 31st, 2006, covering stocks of 525 firms over a period of 461 trading 
days. Excluded from the complete pool of stocks listed on the exchange are those with irregularities 
and unusual exchange sanctions. As the Taiwan Stock Exchange would only release limit book data 
two years after an order or trade is realized, the data period the latest we could obtain. Each data 
record includes date, exact time in hours, minutes and seconds, stock code, price and quantity of all 
orders, filled or not, submitted during the data period. Individual stock returns, market 
capitalizations, daily turnover and price-book ratios are obtained from the Taiwan Economic Journal 
(TEJ) database. 
Each daily session is then divided further into 9 intervals between 9:00 AM and 1:30 PM, with 
30 minutes in each interval. As our data contains flags identifying each investor as either a 
proprietary dealer, an investment trust, a FII or an individual, we are able to extend our analysis 
according to investor types. Over the last ten years, percentages of trades in Taiwan stock market 
accounted for by FII’s have apparently grown much faster than the other two types of local 
institutionals. As a matter of fact, FII’S owns one third of the total market capitalization and account 
for one quarter of daily volume as of end of 2009 in Taiwan. On average, about 15% of the daily 
orders are submitted during the first half hour of a regular four and half hour trading session. In the 
last half hour period, the percentages range between 9% and 19%. Trading in other periods is 
usually slower than open and close. 
To construct the herding intensity measures required for our study, we begin by sorting the 
trades for each day (having excluded all those executed outside normal trading hours) by stock code 
and count the numbers of up and down runs of order prices submitted within a given day, as well as 
within each of the nine 30-minute intervals. We then compute herding statistic in the respective 
periods according to PS (2006). The definition (6) usually makes computed herding measures take 
on negative values. In computing PS herding measures, only the orders actually filled are included 
in the computation to avoid reporting unrealistic herding phenomenon. The computed daily herding 
measures in are larger in magnitudes than when they are computed intra-day, consistent with Dorn, 
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et at. (2008) which argued that herding measures should rise with length of period. For all and each 
type of investors, we bootstrapped their 1%, 5% and 10% critical values. Among all types of 
investors, FII’s exhibit the strongest herding behavior in the opening interval, followed by 
individuals and investment trusts. Herding of proprietary dealers is quite different from the other 
three types, peaking at mid-day sessions.  
After applying the decomposition scheme in (1) and we report in Table III the noise proportion 
in return volatility, for the entire day and each intraday interval, for all and each type of investors 
and across different degrees of trading concentration, rise from open to close, as in Hu (2006). 
However, when there is significant trading concentration, trading noise proportion could fall from 
open to close. We intend to identify possible factor driving trading noise. Does trading noise get 
heavier when market is extremely active? According to the argument of Hu (2006) and Stoll (2000), 
this general transaction cost should apply to everyone in the market, regardless of market 
capitalization of stocks or which trading hour it is. 
In order to explore the effects of trading concentration alone on noise in trading, we use the 
model below to see its influences. We perform a panel regression with generalized least squares 
random effect based on  
tktktk AHN ,,, εβα ++=
 
(8) 
where t=1,…,461 and k=1,…,525. A greater β in magnitude implies stronger noise is produced by 
more intensive herding activity. Table V gives the result of this model. Although the direction of β is 
consistent with its counterpart, with one lag, in Table IV, the distribution across intraday intervals 
and herding significance reveals a somewhat different implication. For the entire observations, the 
magnitudes of coefficients in general peak at mid-day, with the closing interval having the weakest 
coefficient. If we narrow the observations down to only those with significant herding at 10%, the 
magnitudes of coefficients fall by 50%. In another word, when trading is heavily concentrated, the 
degree of concentration contributes much less to trading noise. This is inconsistent with what we 
might want to conclude from Table IV. Trading concentration possibly prevents noise from going up. 
When trading is not heavy, it affects noise more, but not otherwise. 
Lin, Tsai and Sun (2010) argued that trading concentration is closely related to the search cost 
model of VW. We intend to find out how, if any, search motive may affect noise in trading on an 
intraday level with the follow model,  
tktktktktktk BSRSFTBFTSpreadN ,,4,3,2,1, εγγγγα +++++=  (9) 
where t=1,…,461 and k=1,…,525. We performed a panel regression with generalized least squares 
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random effect. Implications of estimated parameters are as follows. The spread effect of search cost 
is proxied by BSD, the average price difference within the period of interest for buy and sell orders 
associated with transaction prices on a given stock. The search times of buy and sell orders are 
proxied by, BFT and SFT respectively. The former is the Ave. time to fill a buy order within the 
period of interest, while the latter is that to fill a sell order. A particular transaction price could 
correspond to more than one orders placed at different times. BSR is the ratio between total buy and 
sell orders for a given stock on a given day. A greater γ1 implies stronger noise is accompanied by 
larger order price spreads, suggesting a weaker search cost effect. Greater γ2 and γ3 imply a stronger 
noise is induced by a longer search time for an equilibrium price, suggesting a stronger the search 
cost effect. A greater γ4 in magnitude implies stronger noise is accompanied by higher buyer-seller 
ratios, indicating VW search model drives trading noise. The results of this model are given in Table 
V, rendering more insight in an intraday dimension. The bottom panel of Table IV shows that 
trading noise is much less likely to be driven by search cost when trading concentrates, and the 
weakest tie between noise and search cost happens at market close. This implies that trading noise 
is more compatible with a situation where not all market participants are bearing the transaction 
cost of noise. The estimation for time-to-fill and buy-sell ratio both supports the notion above. 
 Table VI reports the summary statistics of the order dispersion measure. iDsp
 
at each 
intraday interval, for the whole market or various types of investors, is achieved by first subtracting 
the daily measure and then dividing by it, which assures comparability across investor type. So the 
reported figures in Table V give for the whole market or each type of investor the relative extent of 
dispersion of the respective interval. It is apparent that order price dispersion goes down uniformly 
regardless or investor type. The dispersion of individual investor, however, exhibits the highest 
fluctuation. It is not only substantially higher than the other two types at market open, but is also 
much lower at market close. Order price of foreign institutional investors has the smallest 
dispersion swing, showing the lowest dispersion at market open and the highest dispersion at 
market close. The results in Table VI suggests that individual investors may have enjoyed the 
relatively lower search cost, and therefore producing more conservative order price pattern, at 
market open but the highest liquidity pressure at market close. If information is the cause of this 
distribution, we would expect to see a U-shaped pattern. 
 To determine factors that could have influenced order price dispersion, and hence the 
distribution pattern in Table VI, we chose turnover ratio, holdings and trading volume of foreign 
and domestic institutional investors to see how they affect trading noise. Specifically, we apply the 
following model on our data, 
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tktktktktktktktk VolDIVolFIIShareDIShareFIITODITOFIIN ,,6,5,4,3,2,1, ______ εγγγγγγα +++++++=  (10) 
where t=1,…,461 and k=1,…,525. Results are estimated using a panel GLS with AR(1) adjustments 
on residuals. Results for the entire market are reported in Table VII, which shows that for low-cap 
stocks trading noise is influenced only, and positively, by institutional holdings. But for high-cap 
stocks, trading noise is affected by all six factors. But the effect of institutional holdings is negative, 
while that of FII trading volume is positive. This indicates that the rare case of high institutional 
holding of a certain small-cap stock causes difficulty in trading that specific stock and hence induce 
higher trading noise there. However, in large-cap stocks which institutionals favor, higher turnover 
caused by larger holding actually reduces trading noise for these investors. 
Applying (10) for different types of investors, we could only report in Table VIII results for 
FII’s and individuals, as the model for domestic institutional does not pass the validation test. For 
FII’s, only results for the largest market capitalization are available, and reported at the bottom 
panel, as there are not enough orders submitted for the other four levels. They are similar to the 
results for large-cap in Table VII in that trading noise is reduced by turnover ratio. But FII holding 
and trading volume contributes positively to the build-up of trading noise. In the case of individuals, 
the results are quite apart from those for FII’s, suggesting institutional turnover of a given stock 
somehow induces trading noise for individuals, especially in large-cap stocks. In small-cap stocks, 
institutional turnover is not influential, probably because institutional investors hold and trade less 
in this category. 
The results of VII and VIII provide us a preliminary basis for the exploration of factors driving 
trading liquidity. Information may not be the main cause behind the observed facts, as large-cap 
should have the best information quality among all. So we take a further look at the effect of order 
price dispersion on trading noise. The following model is considered for this purpose, 
tktktk DspN ,,1, εγα ++=  (11) 
where t=1,…,461 and k=1,…,525. Results are estimated using a panel GLS with AR(1) adjustments 
on residuals and reported in Table IX. Similar to the previous models, the model for domestic 
institutional does not pass the validation test again and only results for the largest market 
capitalization are available for FII’s. For FII’s dispersion suppresses trading noise significantly 
except for the first intraday interval. For the individuals, however, dispersion elevates trading noise 
except for the first intraday interval regardless of market capitalizations. The exact mirror type 
pattern that distinguish FII’s from individuals validates the distribution pattern of Table VI, 
supporting notion that low search cost for individuals at market open induces heavy trading and 
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noise. For FII’s, aggressive order price pattern, or lower dispersion, just produces lower trading 
noises at market open. In other intraday intervals, only more aggressive order price pattern would 
produce greater trading noise, confirming the findings of Table V.  
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
This study examines intra-day order book data to study trading noise within stock volatility, 
particularly when trading is heavy, and its driving factors. We adopted a measure of trading 
concentration specifically ideal for high frequency data. The measure is not only constructed on a 
daily level, but also within intra-day time intervals. Although the analysis in the study is still 
preliminary, we have found strong evidences against the idea of trading being a general transaction 
cost, or a friction in market trading. Specifically, we found that trading noise on an intraday level, 
although tend to increase from market open to close, is less likely to take place when trading is 
concentrated at market close. If trading noise is not compatible with phenomena observed during 
heavy trading, then it may not be a general transaction cost. It somewhat explains why noise does 
not respond to heavy trading as much as to all trades when we examine the market as a whole. 
Trading noise is just a specific transaction cost, as information cost, prominent at certain aspect in 
the market. 
Although this noise is high on individual orders and low on institutional orders, its behavior at 
market open is entirely different from the rest of the day. Noises for small cap stocks, unlike 
volatilities, are lower than those for large cap stocks. We also found that noise relates positively to 
trading volume, but inversely to holdings and turnover ratio of institutional investors. Trading noise 
is also found to be sensitive to only certain investors, at certain trading hour and for stocks of 
certain market capitalization, in the market when they trade heavily. Responses from institutional 
and individuals are quite the opposite. The noise proportion generated by individual order rises with 
institutional turnover and search cost encountered, while that of institutional order behaves just 
oppositely. At market open, behaviors of noise from institutional and individual orders just switch 
mutually, and then switch back afterwards. Also, noise from high-cap stocks is actually more 
responsive than that from low-cap ones across investors. So trading noise is a specific transactions 
cost, prominent to only certain investors, at certain time and for certain stocks in the market, rather 
than a general market friction as argued in Stoll (2000). This transactions cost is inversely related to 
search costs encountered in trading, which depends on investor, trading hour of day and market 
capitalization of stocks. 
 15
Although we have presented valid arguments regarding the central issue of this study, there are 
areas yet to be worked on. We have to investigate further behavior of trading noise and its 
distribution among investors. Other analysis, such as trading motives of investors, evidence on 
sequence or development of trading concentration and the dynamics of trading noise need to be 
added to the current model as well.  
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Table I  Noise as Proportion of Stock Returns by Market Capitalization and Intraday Interval 
 Averaged across 525 firms and over 461 days 
  
9:00~9:30  9:30~10:00  10:00~10:30 10:30~11:00 11:00~11:30 11:30~12:00 12:00~12:30 12:30~13:00 13:00~13:30 all day  
MV1*  
Noise Ratio 0.342278  0.349138  0.351538  0.353061  0.353678  0.353752  0.353574  0.35327  0.350522  0.346329  
Volatility  2.94E-06  2.04E-06  1.89E-06  1.83E-06  1.82E-06  1.87E-06  1.87E-06  1.90E-06  2.28E-06  2.06E-06  
MV2  
Noise Ratio 0.299264  0.306318  0.309945  0.310761  0.312009  0.31237  0.311695  0.311612  0.308912  0.301522  
Volatility  5.31E-06  3.48E-06  3.17E-06  3.06E-06  2.98E-06  3.19E-06  3.10E-06  3.10E-06  3.71E-06  3.46E-06  
MV3  
Noise Ratio 0.312762  0.31705  0.318713  0.320591  0.319912  0.320309  0.320878  0.321037  0.318995  0.310814  
Volatility  7.03E-06  4.61E-06  4.15E-06  3.98E-06  3.84E-06  4.23E-06  3.95E-06  4.04E-06  4.93E-06  4.51E-06  
MV4  
Noise Ratio 0.265489  0.270462  0.273346  0.273981  0.274287  0.272752  0.274185  0.274522  0.27341  0.262707  
Volatility  7.94E-06  4.99E-06  4.35E-06  4.16E-06  4.08E-06  4.93E-06  4.17E-06  4.32E-06  5.33E-06  4.93E-06  
MV5  
Noise Ratio 0.273087  0.276788  0.279308  0.279894  0.279174  0.278379  0.279982  0.279452  0.279812  0.268396  
Volatility  8.75E-06  5.54E-06  4.84E-06  4.51E-06  4.61E-06  5.38E-06  4.63E-06  4.73E-06  5.74E-06  5.44E-06  
MV6  
Noise Ratio 0.267541  0.269733  0.272056  0.270965  0.271129  0.27107  0.27164  0.273007  0.273653  0.260174  
Volatility  1.10E-05  6.86E-06  5.83E-06  5.65E-06  5.60E-06  6.40E-06  5.60E-06  5.78E-06  7.18E-06  6.71E-06  
MV7  
Noise Ratio 0.275499  0.275677  0.277627  0.276941  0.276011  0.276052  0.275425  0.278486  0.280638  0.264206  
Volatility  1.38E-05  8.78E-06  7.43E-06  7.32E-06  6.88E-06  8.01E-06  6.98E-06  7.10E-06  8.90E-06  8.41E-06  
MV8  
Noise Ratio 0.253431  0.255456  0.257726  0.260689  0.259907  0.258176  0.259207  0.259522  0.259299  0.242237  
Volatility  1.59E-05  1.00E-05  8.39E-06  7.94E-06  7.76E-06  8.81E-06  7.60E-06  8.11E-06  1.01E-05  9.56E-06  
MV9  
Noise Ratio 0.266264  0.268133  0.269037  0.266463  0.27026  0.264406  0.26723  0.267985  0.270713  0.25229  
Volatility  2.00E-05  1.29E-05  1.11E-05  1.03E-05  1.02E-05  1.11E-05  9.99E-06  1.02E-05  1.31E-05  1.21E-05  
MV10  
Noise Ratio 0.282314  0.280608  0.281831  0.283886  0.281262  0.279193  0.280412  0.282529  0.282901  0.264302  
Volatility  3.37E-05  2.24E-05  1.87E-05  1.77E-05  1.73E-05  1.64E-05  1.65E-05  1.71E-05  2.14E-05  2.04E-05  
* MV1 denotes the decile containing stocks with the largest market capitalization. 
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Table II  Daily and Intra-day Buy and Sell Orders, All Days and When Herding Is Significant at 1% 
By Investor Type 
Investor Type 
9:00~9:30 13:00~13:30 All Day 
All days Days when herding 
is significant at 1% 
All days Days when herding 
is significant at 1% 
All days Days when herding 
is significant at 1% 
 Ave. buy 
orders per 
lot 
Ave. sell 
orders 
per lot 
Ave. buy 
orders 
per lot 
Ave. sell 
orders 
per lot 
Ave. buy 
orders 
per lot 
Ave. sell 
orders 
per lot 
Ave. buy 
orders 
per lot 
Ave. sell 
orders 
per lot 
Ave. buy 
orders 
per lot 
Ave. sell 
orders per 
lot 
Ave. buy 
orders per 
lot 
Ave. sell 
orders per 
lot 
All Stocks 
All 14.19  14.24  15.09  18.33  19.92  18.07  22.82  18.53  8.50  8.45  9.64  9.56  
Proprietary Dealers 29.77  24.81  68.96  15.11  23.37  25.39  26.57  19.69  21.66  22.17  26.22  8.61  
Investment Trusts 41.53  31.41  56.62  29.49  31.58  27.62  66.09  53.32  28.68  25.34  13.77  12.88  
FII’s 27.12  26.18  43.95  25.22  69.19  59.72  130.17 26.60 17.10  17.34  14.05  12.39  
Individual 10.54  11.12  10.05  22.82  9.76  10.18  9.66  17.31  7.29  7.36  7.02  7.67  
 Top Stock Return Decile 
All 5.43  5.24  6.46  5.87  5.67  5.29  7.15  5.65  5.44  5.28  5.99  5.96  
Proprietary Dealers 17.95  15.20  6.36  12.28  11.91  12.60  9.25  12.80  14.96  14.39  6.49  5.33  
Investment Trusts 25.99  17.91  25.48  18.95  22.56  17.95  14.28  5.22  19.33  16.13  11.66  11.08  
FII’s 7.93  6.76  4.73  3.95  13.30  12.61  5.88  4.24  7.52  7.06  4.28  3.90  
Individual 5.02  4.95  5.47  5.32  5.00  4.83  3.00  3.07  5.02  4.94  5.18  5.33  
 Bottom Stock Return Decile 
All 10.81  10.64  15.53  13.06  12.39  12.39  18.76  12.67  10.53  10.85  10.17  12.83  
Proprietary Dealers 32.68  31.13  34.55  20.14  26.12  29.81  56.59  37.77  25.82  28.30  31.04  12.15  
Investment Trusts 58.67  46.06  180.25  24.81  41.04  31.32  45.81  56.36  39.80  34.26  14.58  13.49  
FII’s 18.88  18.87  19.95  6.95  45.79  46.07  39.87  42.69  20.61  20.84  18.02  10.53  
Individual 10.22  9.98  12.58  12.53  9.92  10.18  9.35  10.77  9.64  9.91  8.64  10.71  
 
In thousand shares 
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Table III  Noise as Proportion of Stock Returns by Herding Significance 
 Averaged across 525 firms and over 495 days 
 
Significance All Day 
9:00~    
9:30 
9:30~  
10:00 
10:00~ 
10:30 
10:30~ 
11:00 
11:00~ 
11:30 
11:30~ 
12:00 
12:00~ 
12:30 
12:30~ 
13:00 
13:00~ 
13:30 
All Investors 
1% 0.3242 0.2718 0.3010 0.3082 0.3183 0.3161 0.3122 0.3144 0.3162 0.3066 
5% 0.2981 0.2651 0.2833 0.2918 0.2972 0.2995 0.2984 0.2970 0.2957 0.2944 
10% 0.2916 0.2678 0.2816 0.2880 0.2929 0.2958 0.2944 0.2949 0.2924 0.2943 
Proprietary Dealers 
1% 0.2977 0.2467 0.2462 0.2557 0.2791 0.2822 0.2973 0.3038 0.3349 0.3206 
5% 0.3144 0.2624 0.2822 0.3006 0.3082 0.2957 0.3253 0.3101 0.3165 0.3036 
10% 0.3144 0.2705 0.2849 0.3056 0.3031 0.3076 0.3304 0.3205 0.3187 0.3017 
Investment Trusts 
1% 0.2751 0.1924 0.2358 0.2688 0.2456 0.2773 0.2862 0.2736 0.2778 0.2861 
5% 0.2602 0.2042 0.2429 0.2583 0.2573 0.2675 0.2758 0.2774 0.2870 0.2917 
10% 0.2581 0.2118 0.2410 0.2554 0.2570 0.2673 0.2729 0.2737 0.2805 0.2873 
FII’s 
1% 0.3067 0.2766 0.3084 0.3100 0.3214 0.3166 0.3217 0.3224 0.3218 0.3215 
5% 0.3098 0.2968 0.3099 0.3158 0.3205 0.321 0.3241 0.3211 0.3198 0.3192 
10% 0.3136 0.305 0.3153 0.3188 0.3200 0.3241 0.325 0.3217 0.3224 0.3224 
Individuals 
1% 0.3387 0.2855 0.3129 0.3212 0.3268 0.3294 0.3291 0.3336 0.3383 0.3346 
5% 0.3030 0.2703 0.2871 0.2964 0.3006 0.3011 0.3016 0.3044 0.3037 0.3050 
10% 0.2926 0.2703 0.2837 0.2885 0.2939 0.2959 0.2947 0.2969 0.2959 0.2992 
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Table IV  Effects of Herding on Noise in Panel Regression 
 Intraday Intervals 
In order to explore the effects of trading concentration alone on trading noise, we use the model below to 
see what could have influenced noise. We performed a panel regression with generalized least squares 
random effect based on  
tktktk AHN ,,, εβα ++=  
where t=1,…,495 and k=1,…,525. A greater β in magnitude implies stronger noise is produced by more 
intensive herding activity.  
 
Intraday interval β (x100) No of obs. 
   
All days 
 9:00-9:30 -1.32(0.0128)*** 222,711 
 9:30-10:00 -1.21(0.0140)*** 217,529 
 10:00-10:30 -1.34(0.0153)*** 213,436 
 10:30-11:00 -1.45(0.0161)*** 209,637 
 11:00-11:30 -1.53(0.0168)*** 206,076 
 11:30-12:00 -1.59(0.0170)*** 202,803 
 12:00-12:30 -1.56(0.0173)*** 202,750 
 12:30-13:00 -1.30(0.0166)*** 208,049 
 13:00-13:30 -0.98(0.0161)*** 222,387 
   
Days when herding is significant at 10% 
 9:00-9:30 -0.25(0.0128)*** 22,298 
 9:30-10:00 -0.45(0.0140)*** 21,815 
 10:00-10:30 -0.62(0.0153)*** 21,402 
 10:30-11:00 -0.79(0.0161)*** 20,944 
 11:00-11:30 -0.83(0.0168)*** 20,650 
 11:30-12:00 -0.85(0.0170)*** 20,416 
 12:00-12:30 -0.86(0.0173)*** 20,464 
 12:30-13:00 -0.74(0.0166)*** 20,959 
 13:00-13:30 -0.54(0.0161)*** 22,497 
1. Standard deviations are in the parentheses. 
2. *: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at5%; ***: Significant at1%. 
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Table V  Effects of Search Cost on Noise in Panel Regression 
 Intraday Intervals 
To explore the effects of search motive on trading noise on an intraday level, we use the model below to see what 
could have influenced noise. We performed a panel regression with generalized least squares random effect based 
on  
tktktktktktk BSRSFTBFTSpreadN ,,4,3,2,1, εγγγγα +++++=  
where t=1,…,495 and k=1,…,525. Implications of estimated parameters are similar to those detailed the illustration 
of Table IV.  
 
Intraday interval γ1 (x100) γ2 (x1000) γ3 (x1000) γ4 (x100) No. of obs. 
      
All days 
 9:00-9:30 -3.810(0.028)*** 0.070.003)*** 0.010(0.000)*** -0.680(0.029)*** 222,711 
 9:30-10:00 -2.090(0.035)*** -0.012(0.001)*** -0.026(0.000)*** 1.420(0.032)*** 217,529 
 10:00-10:30 -1.600(0.038)*** -0.016(0.001)*** -0.022(0.000)*** 1.620(0.032)*** 213,436 
 10:30-11:00 -1.260(0.040)*** -0.012(0.001)*** -0.015(0.000)*** 1.690(0.031)*** 209,637 
 11:00-11:30 -1.000(0.041)*** -0.010(0.000)*** -0.014(0.000)*** 1.720(0.031)*** 206,076 
 11:30-12:00 -0.740(0.041)*** -0.008(0.000)*** -0.012(0.000)*** 1.850(0.029)*** 202,803 
 12:00-12:30 -0.600(0.041)*** -0.009(0.000)*** -0.010(0.000)*** 2.030(0.032)*** 202,750 
 12:30-13:00 -0.710(0.040)*** -0.010(0.000)*** -0.009(0.000)*** 2.210(0.034)*** 208,049 
 13:00-13:30 -0.520(0.038)*** -0.011(0.000)*** -0.011(0.000)*** -1.890(0.049)*** 223,711 
      
Days when herding is significant at 10% 
 9:00-9:30 4.470(0.028)*** 0.261(0.003)*** -0.218(0.003)*** 0.540(0.173)** 22,298 
 9:30-10:00 10.340(0.035)*** -0.040(0.001)** -0.094(0.008)*** 0.030(0.144) 21,815 
 10:00-10:30 10.590(0.038)*** -0.004(0.010) -0.051(0.006)*** -0.120(0.179) 21,402 
 10:30-11:00 11.450(0.040)*** 0.000(0.008) -0.033(0.005)*** -0.130(0.164) 20,944 
 11:00-11:30 12.270(0.041)*** -0.016(0.006)** -0.027(0.004)*** -0.130(0.128) 20,650 
 11:30-12:00 12.190(0.041)*** -0.008(0.005)* -0.026(0.004)*** -0.110(0.167) 20,416 
 12:00-12:30 13.440(0.041)*** -0.013(0.004)*** -0.024(0.003)*** -0.150(0.175) 20,464 
 12:30-13:00 13.290(0.040)*** -0.019(0.004)*** -0.024(0.002)*** -0.380(0.201)* 20,959 
 13:00-13:30 13.220(0.038)*** -0.020(0.003)*** -0.025(0.001)*** -0.610(0.208)*** 22,497 
1. Standard deviations are in the parentheses. 
2. *: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at5%; ***: Significant at1%. 
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Table VI  Dispersion of Order Book up to the Fifth Best Orders 
 relative to daily average, across 525 firms and over 461 days 
The dispersion measure of stock i in a given day is defined as  
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where bjDst is the price interval between the jth best buy order price and its next better order price, and 
similarly sjDst  is that for the sell order price. The buy and sell price intervals, up to the fifth best limit 
orders are weighted by bjw  and 
s
jw , the size of the corresponding buy or sell limit orders. For the whole 
market, transaction prices are used to compute the first price interval, while for each type of investors, 
average of buy and sell order price at each priority level is used instead. The measure is designed to show 
how clustered or dispersed the limit orders are in the book. It measures how tightly the orders are placed to 
each other or how closely they are to the midquote and shows the competitiveness between the limit order 
traders. The higher the dispersion is, the less tight the book is, and the lower amount of liquidity the limit 
order book provides.  
 
 
Intraday 
Intervals 
Whole 
Market 
Domestic  
Institutionals  
Foreign 
Institutionals  Individuals  
 09:00-09:30 6.55% 0.99% 0.12% 14.10% 
 09:30-10:00 1.87% 0.19% 0.05% 2.17% 
 10:00-10:30 -0.24% 0.11% 0.03% -0.19% 
 10:30-11:00 -1.24% 0.06% 0.00% -1.27% 
 11:00-11:30 -2.13% 0.01% -0.01% -2.23% 
 11:30-12:00 -2.76% 0.00% -0.03% -2.90% 
 12:00-12:30 -3.28% 0.00% -0.06% -3.47% 
 12:30-13:00 -3.61% 0.04% -0.05% -3.91% 
 13:00-13:30 -3.81% -0.90% -0.04% -4.28% 
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Table VII  Effects of Stock Characteristics on Noise in Panel Regression 
 Whole Market, by Market Caps 
To explore the effects of search motive on trading noise on an intraday level, we use the model below to see what 
could have influenced noise. We performed a panel regression with generalized least squares random effect based 
on  
tktktktktktktktk VolDIVolFIIShareDIShareFIITODITOFIIN ,,6,5,4,3,2,1, ______ εγγγγγγα +++++++=  
where t=1,…,461 and k=1,…,525. Results are estimated using a panel GLS with AR(1) adjustments on residuals. 
 
Intraday 
interval 
γ1 (x100) γ2 (x1000) γ3 (x10) γ4 (x10) γ5 (x105) γ6(x105) 
Smallest Market Caps  
 9:00-9:30 -1.43(0.59)* -0.21(0.68) 0.49(0.23)** -7.38(1.67)*** -2.06(0.72)** 0.52 (1.03) 
 9:30-10:00 -0.43(0.29) -0.86(0.68) 0.51(0.21)** -11.32(1.65)*** -0.39(0.75)** 0.69 (1.09) 
 10:00-10:30 -0.38(0.32)* -1.31(0.81) 0.18(0.22) -12.41(1.67)*** 2.20(0.78)** 1.98 (1.13)* 
 10:30-11:00 -0.42(0.36)* -1.57(0.94)* 0.50(0.26)** -10.87(1.86)*** 0.42(1.31) 0.80 (1.18) 
 11:00-11:30 -0.65(0.32)** -1.16(0.85) 0.61(0.24)** -11.51(1.84)*** 0.90(1.39) -0.09 (1.20) 
 11:30-12:00 0.25(0.30) 0.06(0.84) 0.21(0.22) -11.27(1.71)*** -1.06(0.87)** 0.73 (1.22) 
 12:00-12:30 -0.44(0.33) 0.07(0.90) 0.39(0.24) 12.50(1.85)*** 1.88(1.47) 0.86 (1.23) 
 12:30-13:00 -0.12(0.39) -0.86(0.87) 0.88(0.24)*** -10.13(1.65)*** 1.54(1.49) 0.65 (1.21) 
 13:00-13:30 -0.02(0.28) 0.15(0.69) 0.84(0.21)** -10.17(1.71)*** 0.39(0.78)** 1.34 (1.04) 
       
 Middle Market Caps 
 9:00-9:30 -0.18(0.17) -0.56(0.64) -1.38(0.09)*** -8.37(0.23)*** -0.09(0.06) -0.23 (0.08)** 
 9:30-10:00 -0.27(0.17) 0.05(0.69) -1.30(0.09)*** -7.96(0.22)*** 0.02(0.07) 0.16 (0.08)** 
 10:00-10:30 -0.31(0.31) -0.12(0.65) -1.36(0.16)*** -7.30(0.36)*** -0.46(0.31) 1.07 (0.22)** 
 10:30-11:00 0.03(0.22) 0.71(0.87) -1.38(0.10)*** -7.45(0.23)*** 0.10(0.09) 0.28 (0.10)** 
 11:00-11:30 -0.30(0.25) -0.70(0.91) -1.15(0.11)*** -7.23(0.22)*** 0.02(0.09) 0.34 (0.11)*** 
 11:30-12:00 -0.41(0.24) 0.10(0.90) -1.15(0.010)*** -7.56(0.23)*** 0.02(0.09) 0.40 (0.11)*** 
 12:00-12:30 -0.34(0.23) 0.09(1.00) -1.08(0.10)*** -6.62(0.22)*** 0.02(0.10) 0.17 (0.11)** 
 12:30-13:00 -0.29(0.22) 1.35(0.81)* -1.40(0.10)*** -7.36(0.23)*** -0.01(0.08) 0.18 (0.10)** 
 13:00-13:30 -0.51(0.18)** 1.21(0.75) -1.55(0.09)*** -7.50(0.22)*** -0.12(0.08) 0.13 (0.09)** 
       
 Largest Market Caps 
 9:00-9:30 -12.51(1.59)*** -5.87(1.38)*** -3.15(0.06)*** -16.89(0.42)*** 0.03(0.00)*** -0.14 (0.01)*** 
 9:30-10:00 -12.00(1.79)*** -3.00(1.35)*** -3.06(0.06)*** -16.45(0.38)*** 0.04(0.00)*** -0.07 (0.01)*** 
 10:00-10:30 -11.59(1.82)*** -2.29(1.37)* -3.14(0.06)*** -16.16(0.38)*** 0.05(0.00)*** -0.05 (0.02)*** 
 10:30-11:00 -13.59(1.98)*** -3.37(1.51)** -3.22(0.06)*** -16.28(0.38)*** 0.06(0.00)*** -0.01 (0.01) 
 11:00-11:30 -18.71(2.16)*** -3.14(1.71)*** -3.20(0.06)*** -15.80(0.37)*** 0.06(0.00)*** -0.04 (0.02)** 
 11:30-12:00 -13.56(2.17)*** -5.16(1.68)** -3.12(0.06)*** -16.00(0.35)*** 0.06(0.00)*** -0.04 (0.02)*** 
 12:00-12:30 -15.65(1.14)*** -3.32(1.57)** -3.04(0.06)*** -16.05(0.36)*** 0.06(0.00)*** -0.06 (0.02)*** 
 12:30-13:00 -16.87(2.03)*** -3.52(1.51)** -2.97(0.06)*** -16.77(0.37)*** 0.05(0.00)*** -0.02 (0.01)** 
 13:00-13:30 -12.04(1.82)*** -6.11(1.48)*** -3.02 (0.06)*** -17.46(0.39)*** 0.04(0.00)*** -0.05 (0.02)** 
1. Standard deviations are in the parentheses. 
2. *: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at5%; ***: Significant at1%. 
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Table VIII  Effects of Stock Characteristics on Noise in Panel Regression 
Foreign Institutional and Individual Investors, by Market Caps 
To explore the effects of search motive on intraday trading noise, we use the model below to see what could have 
influenced noise. We performed a panel regression with generalized least squares random effect based on  
tktktktktktktktk VolDIVolFIIShareDIShareFIITODITOFIIN ,,6,5,4,3,2,1, ______ εγγγγγγα +++++++=  
where t=1,…,461 and k=1,…,525. Results are estimated using a panel GLS with AR(1) adjustments on residuals.  
 
Intraday 
interval 
γ1 (x100) γ2 (x1000) γ3 (x10) γ4 (x10) γ5 (x105) γ6(x105) 
Smallest Market Caps - Individuals  
 9:00-9:30 -0.31(0.41) 2.73(1.67) 3.07(0.80)*** 52.56(4.20)*** 3. 40(1.42)** 13.19(2.25)*** 
 9:30-10:00 0.70(0.41) 2.53(1.70) 3.04(0.73)*** 34.44(3.76)*** 6. 71(1.47)*** 23.10(2.23)*** 
 10:00-10:30 0.79(0.38)** -1.68(1.72) 3.18(0.63)*** 24.33(3.61)*** 5. 77(1.60)*** 30.63(2.37)*** 
 10:30-11:00 0.68(0.38)* -0.20(1.66) 2.89(0.55)*** 22.73(3.39)*** 8. 50(1.77)*** 24.15(2.30)*** 
 11:00-11:30 0.15(0.33) -0.44(1.67) 2.12(0.50)*** 18.66(3.29)*** 6. 67(1.62)*** 27.45(2.23)*** 
 11:30-12:00 -1.12(1.18) -3.25(1.58)** 2.76(0.53)*** 16.60(3.22)*** 23.40(2.88)*** 26.13(2.23)*** 
 12:00-12:30 0.19(0.46) 0.98(1.60) 1.40(0.46)*** 17.35(3.12)*** 20.24(2.85)*** 19.13(2.18)*** 
 12:30-13:00 1.92(0.43)*** -0.06(1.70) 1.57(0.52)*** 15.82(3.04)*** 6. 07(1.63)*** 23.54(2.21)*** 
 13:00-13:30 0.36(0.32) 3.02(1.44)** 1.30(0.61)*** 38.19(3.69)*** 7. 41(1.48)*** 21.63(2.02)*** 
 
Middle Market Caps - Individuals 
 9:00-9:30 -16.59(3.91)*** -35.20(6.51)*** 14.27(0.15)*** -6.67(0.50)*** 0.93(0.02)*** 0.27 (0.07)*** 
 9:30-10:00 -16.77(3.58)*** -28.03(6.05)*** 12.77(0.14)*** -4.62(0.45)*** 0.94(0.02)*** 0.27 (0.07)*** 
 10:00-10:30 -21.46(4.27)*** -40.98(7.84)*** 12.58(0.15)*** -4.88(0.49)*** 0.91(0.02)*** 0.36 (0.07)*** 
 10:30-11:00 -20.68(4.53)*** -54.41(8.89)*** 12.73(0.15)*** -5.45(0.53)*** 0.91(0.02)*** 0.47 (0.07)*** 
 11:00-11:30 -18.50(4.50)*** -60.18(9.88)*** 12.85(0.15)*** -6.52(0.55)*** 0.86(0.02)*** 0.53 (0.08)*** 
 11:30-12:00 -13.18(4.29)*** -50.76(10.1)*** 13.56(0.16)*** -6.75(0.55)*** 0.85(0.02)*** 0.43 (0.08)*** 
 12:00-12:30 -19.24(4.98)*** -25.24(6.38)*** 13.90(0.16)*** -6.74(0.59)*** 0.88(0.02)*** 0.51 (0.08)*** 
 12:30-13:00 -16.03(4.70)*** -31.21(7.16)*** 14.79(0.16)*** -6.66(0.57)*** 0.84(0.02)*** 0.55 (0.08)*** 
 13:00-13:30 -13.56(3.30)*** -18.56(4.57)*** 13.49(0.13)*** -5.30(0.40)*** 0.85(0.02)*** 0.27 (0.06)*** 
 
Largest Market Caps – Foreign Intitutionals 
 9:00-9:30 8.74 (3.77)** 7.10(3.60)** 0.07(0.06) -1.94(0.20)*** 0. 09(0.01)*** -0.06(0.03)* 
 9:30-10:00 21.56(4.12)*** 16.95(3.97)*** 0.66(0.08)*** 0.55(0.24)** 0. 07(0.01)*** 0.11(0.03)*** 
 10:00-10:30 36.12(4.64)*** 18.05(4.41)*** 1.07(0.10)*** 1.82(0.29)*** 0. 09(0.01)*** 0.25(0.04)*** 
 10:30-11:00 51.96(5.20)*** 19.61(4.81)*** 1.61(0.11)*** 3.70(0.33)*** 0. 11(0.01)*** 0.40(0.04)*** 
 11:00-11:30 63.50(5.48)*** 24.13(4.94)*** 1.98(0.12)*** 4.48(0.37)*** 0. 14(0.01)*** 0.55(0.04)*** 
 11:30-12:00 77.99(5.90)*** 35.91(5.06)*** 2.32(0.12)*** 5.06(0.38)*** 0. 15(0.01)*** 0.61(0.04)*** 
 12:00-12:30 75.48(5.81)*** 37.05(5.01)*** 2.26(0.12)*** 5.30(0.39)*** 0. 16(0.01)*** 0.65(0.05)*** 
 12:30-13:00 61.27(5.41)*** 29.05(4.65)*** 1.76(0.11)*** 2.73(0.35)*** 0. 11(0.01)*** 0.43(0.04)*** 
 13:00-13:30 30.35 (4.68)*** 8.31(4.21)** 0.87(0.08)*** 0.35(0.26) 0. 09(0.01)*** 0.19(0.04)*** 
 
Largest Market Caps - Individuals 
 9:00-9:30 8.74 (3.77)** 7.10(3.60)** 0.07(0.06) -1.94(0.20)*** 0. 09(0.01)*** -0.06(0.03)* 
 9:30-10:00 21.56(4.12)*** 16.95(3.97)*** 0.66(0.08)*** 0.55(0.24)** 0. 07(0.01)*** 0.11(0.03)*** 
 10:00-10:30 36.12(4.64)*** 18.05(4.41)*** 1.07(0.10)*** 1.82(0.29)*** 0. 09(0.01)*** 0.25(0.04)*** 
 10:30-11:00 51.96(5.20)*** 19.61(4.81)*** 1.61(0.11)*** 3.70(0.33)*** 0. 11(0.01)*** 0.40(0.04)*** 
 11:00-11:30 63.50(5.48)*** 24.13(4.94)*** 1.98(0.12)*** 4.48(0.37)*** 0. 14(0.01)*** 0.55(0.04)*** 
 11:30-12:00 77.99(5.90)*** 35.91(5.06)*** 2.32(0.12)*** 5.06(0.38)*** 0. 15(0.01)*** 0.61(0.04)*** 
 12:00-12:30 75.48(5.81)*** 37.05(5.01)*** 2.26(0.12)*** 5.30(0.39)*** 0. 16(0.01)*** 0.65(0.05)*** 
 12:30-13:00 61.27(5.41)*** 29.05(4.65)*** 1.76(0.11)*** 2.73(0.35)*** 0. 11(0.01)*** 0.43(0.04)*** 
 13:00-13:30 30.35 (4.68)*** 8.31(4.21)** 0.87(0.08)*** 0.35(0.26) 0. 09(0.01)*** 0.19(0.04)*** 
1. Standard deviations are in the parentheses. 
2. *: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at5%; ***: Significant at1%. 
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Table IX  Effects of Stock Characteristics on Noise in Panel Regression 
Foreign Institutional and Individual Investors, by Market Caps 
To explore the effects of search motive on trading noise on an intraday level, we use the model 
below to see what could have influenced noise. We performed a panel regression with 
generalized least squares random effect based on  
tktktk DspN ,,1, εγα ++=  with 
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and t=1,…,461 and k=1,…,525. Results are estimated using a panel GLS with AR(1) adjustments 
on residuals.  
 
Intraday interval FII’s Individuals 
 γ1 (x1000) No. of Obs. γ1 (x100) No. of Obs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Smallest Market Caps 
 9:00-9:30   -1.67(0.23)***  34,016 
 9:30-10:00   -0.93(0.36)***  30,295 
 10:00-10:30   3.08(0.48)***  27,200 
 10:30-11:00   5.24(0.78)***  24,886 
 11:00-11:30   5.05(0.58)***  22,835 
 11:30-12:00   7.11(0.63)***  21,360 
 12:00-12:30   6.80(0.60)***  20,936 
 12:30-13:00   6.97(0.51)***  23,243 
 13:00-13:30   5.31(0.32)***  34,183 
     
Middle Market Caps 
 9:00-9:30   -2.44(0.40)***  44,497 
 9:30-10:00   1.34(0.63)**  45,936 
 10:00-10:30   8.56(0.82)***  43,296 
 10:30-11:00   17.00(0.92)***  42,194 
 11:00-11:30   20.95(1.01)***  41,344 
 11:30-12:00   25.95(1.01)***  40,481 
 12:00-12:30   23.28(0.98)***  40,388 
 12:30-13:00   24.45(0.85)***  41,653 
 13:00-13:30   16.12(0.65)***  45,273 
       
 Largest Market Caps 
 9:00-9:30 0.56(0.11)***  34,166 -1.20(0.47)***  48,159 
 9:30-10:00 -0.48(0.13)***  32,370 1.79(0.74)***  47,914 
 10:00-10:30 -0.62(0.16)***  30,476 3.04(0.90)***  47,595 
 10:30-11:00 -0.65(0.19)***  30,213 10.77(1.07)***  47,329 
 11:00-11:30 -0.57(0.20)***  29,797 17.84(1.20)***  47,050 
 11:30-12:00 -0.58(0.19)***  30,258 23.59(1.21)***  46,864 
 12:00-12:30 -0.24(0.19)***  30,549 23.13(1.15)***  46,846 
 12:30-13:00 -0.40(0.17)**  32,114 20.38(1.00)***  47,239 
 13:00-13:30 -0.36(0.10)***  38,055 11.99(0.82)***  48,091 
1. Standard deviations are in the parentheses. 
2. *: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at5%; ***: Significant at1%. 
